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Abstract 
 
The A-theory and the B-theory advance competing claims about how time is 
grounded. The A-theory says that A-facts are more fundamental in grounding time 
than are B-facts, and the B-theory says the reverse. We argue that whichever theory is 
true of the actual world is also true of all possible worlds containing time. We do 
this by arguing that time is uniquely groundable: however time is actually 
grounded, it is necessarily grounded in that way. It follows that if either the A-
theory or the B-theory is actually false, then it is necessarily false.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we suggest that a helpful way to understand the dispute between A-
theorists and B-theorists is in terms of how they see the relative fundamentality of the A- 
and B-series. In particular, we will argue that the A-theory is best understood as the view 
that what we call A-facts are more fundamental in grounding temporal facts, than are 
what we call B-facts.  
 
We will not try to establish which of these theories is true, either in the actual world or in 
other possible worlds. Instead, we will argue that whichever theory is true of the actual 
world, it is also true of all possible worlds containing time. This is important since, of 
late, the orthodoxy that metaphysical theses are, if true, necessarily true, has come under 
significant pressure. 1  Furthermore, there is special reason to be sceptical of such 
necessitarian claims concerning the nature of time. McTaggart-style arguments, which are 
designed to show that the A-theory is internally inconsistent (and hence necessarily false), 
have not been widely accepted, and there are no analogous arguments against the B-
theory. Since the actual nature of time is an empirical matter, in the absence of reasons to 
suppose that time must, of necessity, be however it is actually, it is natural to conclude 
that the nature of time is contingent.2 For instance, empirically minded philosophers of 
time often take themselves to have reason, via empirical considerations (particularly 
considerations arising from the theories of special and general relativity) to suppose that 
actually the B-theory is true. But such philosophers do not thereby take themselves to 
have reason to suppose that the B-theory is necessarily true, since absent a priori reasons 
to hold that the A-theory is necessarily false, there is no reason to suppose that all worlds 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Defenders of “contingentism” about a variety of metaphysical areas include: Cameron (2007), Miller 
(2010) and Parsons (2006) about composition; Balaguer (1998), Field (2003) and Colyvan (2000; 2001) 
about mathematical objects; Miller (2009; 2010) and Rosen (2006) more generally about metaphysical 
theses; and Balaguer (2014) about temporal ontology.   
2 Something like these considerations motivate Balaguer’s  (2014) contingentism about temporal ontology.  
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are like ours in terms of these empirical features.3 Therefore, one cannot simply assume 
that whichever theory of time is true, is true of necessity: indeed, one apparently has 
some reason to suppose that any particular theory of time is at best contingently true. In 
what follows, we argue against this contingentist trend.4 
 
We will do this by arguing that temporal facts (unlike many other kinds of facts) are 
uniquely groundable: however temporal facts are actually grounded, they are necessarily 
grounded in that way.5 It follows that if either the A-theory or the B-theory is actually 
false, then it is necessarily false. This result focuses the debate between A-theorists and 
B-theorists on the actual world: whichever side wins there will thereby win in all possible 
worlds. This raises the prospect of defending modal claims about time on the basis of 
contingent facts, and exposes such claims to empirical science. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we show that the debate between the A-
theory and the B-theory is, in part, a debate about how temporal facts are grounded; and 
we set out some plausible general principles about grounding. In Section 3, we show 
how, if one endorses these principles, then the sphere of possible worlds in which 
temporal facts have a grounding structure that is different from their actual grounding 
structure is much more constrained than expected. In Section 4, we argue that temporal 
facts are uniquely groundable. In Section 5, we consider the consequences of this for the 
metaphysics of time. 
 
 
2. Grounding, the A-theory, and the B-theory 
 
In this section we will set out a few assumptions and definitions related to grounding to 
which we will later appeal, and then argue that the A-theorist and the B-theorist are best 
seen as disagreeing about (among other things) how temporal facts are grounded. We will 
then draw some conclusions about the ways in which the grounds of time can vary 
across worlds, on the assumption that these grounding principles are true.  
 
2.1 Grounding  
 
Metaphysics is concerned not only with what exists, but also with what is more 
fundamental that what.6 We will represent fundamentality using a two-place grounding 
relation, which we take to be irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive. We further assume 
that the relata of the grounding relation are facts.7 To represent this, we adopt the usual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  See for instance Mozersky (2000) and Wüthrich (2011)). 4	  Although we do not attempt, here, to respond to Balaguer (2014), we think that what we say in this paper 
can provide some resources to respond to his argument for contingentism about temporal ontology, by 
showing in virtue of what certain conditionals are, if true, necessarily true: to wit, they are made true by a 
priori principles of ground, plus a priori truths about what sort of thing “time” can refer to, plus empirical 
facts about time’s actual structured ground. 
5 We are also committed to the stronger claim that however time is grounded in any world, necessarily, it is 
grounded that way. But, as we will see throughout the paper, there is good reason to emphasize the role of 
the actual world, and it is the thesis as just articulated that we defend. 6	  Here we largely follow Schaffer (2009, pp. 375-6). Throughout the paper we will give formal statements 
in footnotes, for interested readers; others can ignore these and follow the main text.  
7 Thus we assume that grounding claims consist of a relational predicate like  ‘is grounded in’ flanked by 
names for two distinct facts (e.g., ‘The fact that p is grounded in the fact that q’). Nothing we say, however, 
hangs on this way of regimenting grounding claims. One could equally hold that grounding claims should 
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convention according to which [x] is to be read as the fact that x. Canonical grounding 
claims thereby take the form: [x] grounds [y] in world w.8 Grounding is partial and 
relative: a fact may have multiple grounds; and a fact’s grounds may in turn be grounded 
by other facts. If [x] obtains in w and has no grounds in w, call [x] fundamental in w. If [x] 
obtains in w and has grounds in w, call [x] derivative in w. 
 
For each [x] in w, define the total ground of [x] in w, written G([x],w), as the set containing 
precisely those facts that ground [x] in w.9 For all [x] in w, define the structured ground of [x] 
in w, denoted S([x],w), as the ordered pair consisting of, first, G([x],w), and second, that 
part of the grounding relation in w that specifies all and only the grounding relationships 
among the total grounds of [x] in w.10 The total ground of [x] in w thus provides the 
entire list of what grounds [x] in w; the structured ground of [x] in w likewise provides 
the entire list of what grounds [x] in w, and also describes the grounding relationships 
among these facts. Note that [x] is fundamental in w just in case G([x],w) is the empty 
set, ∅. In this case, S([x],w) is the ordered pair consisting of ∅ and the empty relation on 
∅. 
 
Here’s an example. Consider the fact [chairs exist], which obtains in the actual world, @. 
The actual total ground of [chairs exist], written G([chairs exist],@), is the set of all facts 
that actually ground the existence of chairs. This set includes [wood exists], [molecules 
exist], [atoms exist], and so on. The actual total ground of [chairs exist] is thus simply a 
set of facts. The actual structured ground of [chairs exist] specifies this same set of facts, 
and in addition specifies the grounding relationships within that set. For example, as well 
as saying that both [atoms exist] and [molecules exist] ground [chairs exist], it specifies 
that [atoms exist] grounds [molecules exists]. A fact’s ground provides some detail about 
how that fact is grounded; that fact’s structured ground provides more detail. 
 
Next, say that [x] underpins [y] in w just in case [x] grounds [y] in w, and in w, any ground 
of [y] other than [x] either itself grounds [x], or else is grounded by [x].11 For example, if 
(in the actual world) [molecules exist] underpins [chairs exist], then [molecules exist] 
grounds [chairs exist], and any other fact that grounds [chairs exist] either itself grounds 
[molecules exist] (for example, [atoms exist]) or is grounded by [molecules exist] (for 
example, [wood exists]). What’s ruled out is that [chairs exist] has some other ground, 
entirely independent of [molecules exist]. Intuitively, then, if [x] underpins [y], then there 
is no path through the structured ground of [y] that does not go through [x]. Indeed, we 
can think of [x] as a sort of sufficient condition for the obtaining of [y], in the following 
sense: in any world in which [x] underpins [y], the existence of [x] entails the existence of 
[y]; for once you have [x], you also have all the other grounds of [y], since those grounds 
are either grounded by [x], or they ground [x]. Moreover, if [x] underpins [y], then there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
exists, because Socrates exists’. See for instance Fine (2012) for a defense of this latter view.  
8 Formally, we can write [x]\w[y]. We employ a world subscript to the grounding relation in order to allow 
for the prospect that grounding relationships may vary between worlds.  
9 That is: G([x],w) ={[y] : [y]\w [x]} 
10 Let /xw denote the grounding relation restricted to G([x],w). That is, if we write \w as the set of ordered 
pairs {<[y],[z]> : [y]\w[z]}, then \xw is the subset of this set given by {< [y],[z]> : [y]\w[x]  and [z]\w[x] and 
[y]\w[z] }. We then have S([x],w)=<G([x],w), \xw>. 11	  Writing [x]↓w[y] to say that [x] underpins [y] in w, we have: [x]↓w [y] just in case ([x]\w[y] & ∀z(([x]≠[z] 
& [z]\w[y]) → ([x]\w[z] ∨ [z]\w[x]))). 
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is no grounding overdetermination: there is nothing else that is not grounded by [x], or 
which [x] grounds, that also grounds [y].12 
 
Say that [x] is multiply groundable if there are worlds v and w such that [x] obtains both in v 
and in w, and S([x],v) ≠ S([x],w). Thus to be multiply groundable is to exist with different 
structured grounds in different worlds. A fact can be multiply groundable in two ways: it 
can have different total grounds in different worlds; or it can have the same total ground 
in all worlds in which it obtains, but be grounded differently in different worlds, in the 
sense that its grounds stand in different grounding relationships to one another in 
different worlds. If a fact is not multiply groundable, say that it is uniquely groundable. Thus 
[x] is uniquely groundable if and only if, for all worlds v and w such that [x] obtains both 
in v and in w, we have S([x],v) = S([x],w). A fact is uniquely groundable just in case it has 
the same structured ground in every world in which it obtains. 
 
We think that some facts are multiply groundable. Facts such as [society is just], [Joe is in 
pain], [this mushroom is poisonous], and so forth, seem like plausible instances of 
multiply groundable phenomena. We take it that this is relatively uncontroversial and will 
not argue for it here. Our aim, in this paper, is to argue that temporal facts are uniquely 
groundable. (See Section 4.) 
 
We will now state and discuss several grounding principles, that is, principles about 
ground. The first, G-NEC, is well accepted by defenders of grounding, and we will offer 
no defence of it. The second, NOF, is more controversial. While we offer a reason to 
endorse the principle, our aim is not, in this paper, to argue in favour of particular 
principles of ground.  Rather, we want to show what follows from accepting some 
principles that we (and many others) take to be plausible, and therefore to show what 
one must deny if one wishes to deny our conclusion. 
 
Our first assumption concerns the extent to which the grounding relationships among 
facts can vary from world to world. One can divide those who investigate grounding into 
two broad camps: grounding necessitarians and grounding contingentists. Grounding 
necessitarians hold that there is a necessitation relation between that which grounds, and 
that which is grounded. Grounding necessitarianism is often expressed as the view that if 
[x] is the total ground of [y], then [y] is necessitated by [x], where [y] is necessitated by [x] 
iff for any possible world in which [x] obtains, [y] obtains. Intuitively, the idea is that 
since a total ground is, by definition, sufficient, in the relevant world, for the existence of 
that which it grounds, we should think it is sufficient simpliciter. Clearly, however, 
something less than the total ground might also be sufficient for the existence of that 
which is grounded: namely, anything that underpins that grounded entity. Thus we will 
take grounding necessitarianism to be the view that if [x] underpins [y], then necessarily, 
[x] grounds [y]. Thus we formulate grounding necessitarianism as follows:  
 
G-NEC: If [x] underpins [y] in w, then for any world w*, if [x] obtains in w*, then 
[y] obtains in w* and [x] grounds [y] in w*.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 So, for example, if a disjunctive fact is made true by both disjuncts, and neither disjunct grounds the 
other, then the disjunction has no underpinning, since this would be a case of grounding 
overdetermination.  	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This says: if in some world [x] underpins [y], then in any world in which [x] obtains, [y] 
also obtains and is grounded by [x]. This definition commits grounding necessitarians not 
only to supposing that if [x] underpins [y] in w, then for any world, w*, if [x] obtains in 
w* then [y] obtains in w*, but also to the claim that [x] grounds [y] in w*.13 
 
Since necessitarianism is by far the most common view amongst those who accept 
grounding, we will have nothing to say in its defence. We recognize that those (few) who 
deny G-NEC will be unmoved by some of what follows. 
 
Having assumed G-NEC, we now introduce a further definition. Say that [x] is a sufficient 
ground for [y] just in case there is a possible world w such that [x] underpins [y] in w. The 
intuitive idea we are aiming to capture here is as follows. If [x] is a sufficient ground for 
[y], then provided that [x] obtains, it is guaranteed that [y] obtains: no further facts 
beyond [x] are needed to ground [y]. Note that if [x] is a sufficient ground for [y], then it 
follows that [x] is a possible underpinning of [y], but not that [x] is an actual underpinning 
of [y]: it may be that in the actual world, some further fact, [z], happens to ground [y], 
along with [x], such that [z] and [x] jointly over-determine [y].14 Intuitively, sufficiency 
entails that [x] is capable of grounding [y], all by itself, not that it actually does so. (An 
analogy: Xavier might be strong enough to lift the cupboard alone, even if he in fact 
receives help from Zoltan; the relevant question is whether Xavier is capable of lifting the 
cupboard alone, not whether he in fact does so.) Now, given G-NEC, this intuitive notion 
of sufficiency is plausibly captured by possible underpinning.  For if there is a world w in 
which [x] underpins [y], then G-NEC guarantees that every world in which [x] obtains is 
such that [y] obtains and is grounded by [x]. (In our analogy: every world in which Xavier 
tries to lift the cupboard, with or without help, he succeeds.) The best explanation for 
this guarantee is surely that [x] is sufficient, all by itself, to ground [y]. After all, were [x] 
not sufficient, then we'd expect there to be a possible world in which [x] obtains but [y] 
does not. (In the analogy: if in some worlds Xavier were not strong enough to lift the 
cupboard by himself, we’d expect there to be worlds in which he attempts to lift the 
cupboard without help, and fails.) But this is precisely what G-NEC rules out. Thus, 
given G-NEC, being a sufficient ground amounts to being a possible underpinning. 
Since we are assuming G-NEC, our definition plausibly captures the target notion of a 
sufficient ground. 
 
The second principle we call the Necessity Of Fundamentality:  
 
NOF: If [f] is fundamental in world w, then for any world w* in which [f] obtains, 
[f] is fundamental in w*.  
 
NOF says that fundamentality cannot vary from world to world: if a fact is fundamental 
in some world, then it is fundamental in any word in which it obtains. It follows that if a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  One might contend that grounding necessitarians are only committed to the claim that if [x] underpins 
[y] in w, then for any world, w*, if [x] obtains in w* then [y] obtains in w*. That would leave it open that in 
w* either y underpins x, or x underpins y, or neither underpins the other, and would also leave it open that 
[x] grounds [y], or [y] grounds [x], or that no grounding relation obtains between [x] and [y]. But that would 
make it mysterious why we should think that wherever [x] obtains, [y] obtains: surely we think this is so 
because we think that in any world in which [x] obtains, [x] grounds [y].	  14	  Consider a case of disjunction. In worlds where only one disjunct is true, that disjunct underpins the 
truth of the disjunction. But in worlds where both disjuncts are true, neither disjunct underpins the truth of 
the disjunction, because there is, in effect, grounding overdetermination. Nevertheless, each disjunct is a 
sufficient ground for the truth of the disjunction.	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fact is derivative in some world, then it is derivative in any world in which it obtains. 
There has been very little discussion of the status of NOF in the literature; that seems 
like a mistake (which we hope to begin to remedy). To reject NOF is to accept that what 
it is to be fundamental is just to happen to be a fact upon which everything else rests and 
which rests upon nothing else.15 On this view, being fundamental is an entirely relational 
matter: it amounts to being located at a particular place in a grounding structure. To 
endorse NOF is to reject this characterization of fundamentality. One motivation for 
doing so is the widely held view that grounding relations track relational essences. On 
such a view, if [x] grounds [y], then it is essential to [x] that [x] grounds [y].  On this view, 
part of what it is to be some fundamental fact, [f], is to be such that [f] grounds certain 
further facts. If that is right, then whenever [f] obtains, [f] will be fundamental. 
Moreover, it is part of the essential nature of derivative facts that they are grounded 
(though perhaps grounded in different facts in different worlds). It follows that for any 
derivative fact, [d], [d] is grounded by some further fact in every world in which [d] 
obtains.  
 
We find NOF plausible, and will henceforth explore the consequences of assuming it.  
Since there is little discussion of NOF, and there are some good reasons to accept it, it 
ought to be of interest to see what follows from accepting NOF (alongside other 
plausible principles).   
 
We can derive two consequences from G-NEC and NOF. First, from G-NEC, we can 
derive what we call the Necessary Relative Grounding Principle: 
 
NRGP: If [x] underpins [y] in w, then there is no w* such that [y] underpins [x] in 
w*. 
 
This says that the relationship of underpinning cannot be “reversed” across worlds. To 
see that NRGP follows from G-NEC, suppose that [x] underpins [y] in w. By G-NEC, it 
follows that [x] grounds [y] in any world w* in which [x] obtains. Since grounding is 
asymmetric, it follows that [y] does not ground [x] any world w*, and so that [y] does not 
underpin [x] in any world w*. Thus we have NRGP.  
 
 The second consequence of NOF and G-NEC is:  
 
FUND: If in the actual world [f] is fundamental and [f] underpins [x], then in 
every world in which [f] obtains, [f] is fundamental and [f] grounds [x].  
 
This says that if [f] is actually fundamental and actually underpins [x], then [f] is 
fundamental and grounds [x] in every world in which [f] obtains. To see that FUND 
follows from NOF and G-NEC, suppose that in the actual world [f] is fundamental and 
[f] underpins [x], and let w be a world in which [f] obtains. Then by NOF, [f] is 
fundamental in w. And by G-NEC, [x] obtains in w and [f] grounds [x] in w. Thus we 
have FUND. 
 
Recall that [x] is multiply groundable just in case there are worlds v and w such that [x] 
obtains in both v and w and S([x],v) ≠ S([x],w): that is, just in case there are two worlds in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Schaffer, for instance, rejects NOF, since he thinks the whole universe is fundamental. Since he thinks 
there are other worlds in which our universe is a proper part of that universe, he thinks that in that world 
our universe is derivative (being grounded in the whole universe in that world).	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which [x] obtains such that [x] has a different structured ground in each world. Now, say 
that [x] is multiply underpinnable if there are worlds v and w such that [x] obtains in both v 
and w, and in v, [y] underpins [x], while in w, [y] does not underpin [x]. Note that if [x] is 
multiply underpinnable, then [x] is multiply groundable. For if [x] is underpinned by [y] 
in v and is not underpinned by [y] in w, this must be because either (i) [y] grounds [x] in v 
but not in w, in which case [x] has a different structured ground in v than it does in w, or 
(ii) [y] grounds [x] in v and w, but [y] does not underpin [x] in w because in w there is a 
further independent ground of [x], in which case [x] has a different structured ground in 
v than it does in w. The converse does not hold. That is, [x] may be multiply groundable 
without being multiply underpinnable. For [x] may have a different structured ground in 
v and w, but have the same (unstructured) grounds in v and w. If [x] has the same 
unstructured ground in all worlds, then it will have the same underpinnings in all those 
worlds even though its structured ground varies across worlds. Our intention, in Section 
3, is to argue that some facts, in particular, temporal facts, are neither multiply 
groundable nor multiply underpinnable. To show this we only need to show that 
temporal facts are not multiply groundable, since this entails that they are not multiply 
underpinnable. This means denying the following:  
 
SMGT: For any [x] such that [x] is derivative and [x] obtains at more than one 
world, there are worlds v and w such that S([x],v) ≠ S([x],w).  
 
The Strong Multiple Groundability Thesis (SMGT) says that every fact that is derivative in 
some world (and thus if NOF is true, derivative in every world) is such that it has 
different structured grounds in different worlds.16 Our aim in Section 3 is to show that 
there are some facts, namely temporal facts, that are uniquely groundable (and therefore 
uniquely underpinnable), and therefore that SMGT is false. 
 
2.2 The A-theory and the B-theory 
 
We take the A-theorist and the B-theorist to make competing claims about how temporal 
facts are grounded. According to B-theorists, there exists no A-series that is not 
reducible to B-relations (relations of earlier than, later than, and simultaneous with) and 
indexical facts. Thus talk about past, present, and future is really talk about where one is 
located (the present), about events earlier than one’s location (past events), and about 
events later than one’s location (future events). By contrast, A-theorists hold that the 
temporal series consists in an order of events in terms of the monadic A-properties of 
being past, present, and future.17 According to the A-theorist, B-relations are reducible to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Compare this to the Weak Multiple Groundability Thesis (WMGT): 
 
WMGT: For some [x] such that x is derivative and [x] obtains at multiple worlds, there are worlds v 
and w such that S([x],v) ≠ S([x],w) 
 
WMGT says that there is at least something that is multiply groundable. We accept WMGT but will not 
argue for it here.  17	  Not every A-theorist might be happy with this characterization. For instance, some presentists either 
deny that there are properties of pastness and futurity, or deny that there are properties of pastness, 
presentness, or futurity (instead, there is just existence). We do not think it obvious that presentists need to 
deny the existence of said A-properties, and so think that we can adequately capture a presentist view. For 
instance, it is no part of our framework that such properties must be primitive or fundamental, and we see 
no reason why a presentist should deny there are such properties thus understood. However, presentists 
who do deny there are such properties will not find this framework amenable. 	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these monadic A-properties. Thus A- and B-theorists make opposing claims about 
ontological priority: they disagree about what is the more fundamental ground of time.  
 
We will suppose that for each A-property instantiated by a certain set of objects and 
events, there exists a corresponding fact. Thus, for instance, for any object or event that 
has the property of being present, there is an A-fact, which is the fact that that object or 
event has the property of being present. Likewise, for any object or event that has the 
property of being past (or future), there is an A-fact, which is the fact that that object or 
event has the property in question. We call the complete set of these facts the A-facts. In 
addition, we will suppose that for every B-relation that obtains between two relata, there 
is a B-fact that corresponds to the obtaining of that relation. Thus for any pair of objects 
or events, E and E*, if E bears the relation of being earlier-than (or, respectively, later-
than, or simultaneous-with) E*, then there is a B-fact which is the fact that E bears the 
relation of being earlier-than (or, respectively, later-than, or simultaneous-with) to E*. 
We call the complete set of these facts the B-facts. Roughly speaking, then, the A-theorist 
thinks that the A-facts ground the B-facts. The B-theorist thinks the reverse is true.  
 
Say that w is A-theoretic iff: (1) temporal facts obtain in w;18 (2) A-facts obtain in w and 
ground the temporal facts in w; and (3) if any B-facts obtain in w, then either the A-facts 
ground the B-facts in w, or the B-facts are not a sufficient ground for the A-facts. 
 
Say that w is B-theoretic iff: (i) temporal facts obtain in w; (ii) B-facts obtain in w and 
ground the temporal facts in w; and (iii) if A-facts obtain in w, then the B-facts ground 
the A-facts in w, and the B-facts are a sufficient ground for the A-facts. 
 
Some care is needed here. When the A-theorist says that B-facts are grounded by A-facts, 
she takes the A-facts in question to involve monadic A-properties. When the B-theorist 
says that A-facts are grounded by B-facts, she supposes that the A-facts do not include 
monadic properties. For this reason, it is common to refer to the A-properties posited by 
the A-theorist as irreducible A-properties, and those posited by the B-theorist as reducible 
A-properties.  We think this is misleading: while the A-theorist is committed to the 
existence of A-properties that do not reduce to B-relations, she need not be committed 
to the existence of A-properties that are irreducible simpliciter.19 
 
Consider Figure 1. In w1, the A-facts underpin both the B-facts and the temporal facts, 
and the B-facts underpin the temporal facts. Our definitions classify this world as A-
theoretic, as is intuitively correct. In w2, the B-facts underpin both the A-facts and the 
temporal facts, and the A-facts underpin the temporal facts. Our definitions classify this 
world as B-theoretic, again correctly. In w3, both the B-facts and something else, X, 
ground the A-facts, and the A-facts underpin the temporal facts while the B-facts do not 
(though the B-facts do ground the temporal facts). On our definitions, how w3 is 
classified depends on whether or not the B-facts are a sufficient ground for the A-facts. 
This in turn depends on whether there is a possible world in which the B-facts underpin 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Here, we suppose that temporal facts obtain in w iff w contains time.	  	  19	  Notice that given our characterization, some recent versions of presentism that are purportedly not A-
theoretic turn out to be so. On views such as those of Tallant (2012) and Rasmussen (2015), times are 
abstract objects (all of which exist) related by primitive B-relations, but only one of which obtains (or is 
true), and which one obtains, changes. On this view the B-relations are primitive (and not grounded in any 
A-facts). On the assumption, however, that the property of being present is an A-fact, on our taxonomy 
this is still a version of the A-theory. For there are A-facts (like being present) that are not underpinned  
(or grounded) by the B-relations. 	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the A-facts: if w2 is possible, then the B-facts are a sufficient ground for the A-facts, and 
w3 counts as B-theoretic; if no world like w2 is possible, then the B-facts are not a 
sufficient ground for the A-facts, and w3 counts as A-theoretic. In the former case, X is 
not doing any heavy lifting in w3, and the B-facts alone are enough to deliver the A-facts 
and the temporal facts; so it’s intuitively correct to count w3 as B-theoretic. In the latter 
case, X is playing a crucial role in grounding the A-facts and the temporal facts in w3, 
and so w3 is intuitively not B-theoretic. 
 
!
Temporal!facts!!
B/facts!
w1!
A/facts!
Temporal!facts!!
A/facts!
w2!
B/facts!
w3!
X!
Temporal!facts!!
A/facts!
B/facts!
 
 
FIGURE 1. 
 
Our definitions leave it open that (either version of) the A-theory or the B-theory is 
contingently true. For all the definitions say, some worlds may be A-theoretic and others 
B-theoretic. Call this view contingentism, and its negation necessitarianism. Necessitarianism is 
thus the view that either the A-theory or the B-theory (or both) is necessarily false.  
 
  
3. Necessitarianism and the unique groundability of time 
 
Are there reasons for supposing time to be uniquely groundable that arise from the 
grounding principles we listed earlier?  In this section, we show that although these 
principles do not entail that temporal facts are uniquely groundable unless temporal facts 
are actually fundamental, they do entail that there are far fewer possible structured 
grounds of the temporal facts that one might have expected. 
 
One can partition epistemic possibility space into cases in which the temporal facts are 
actually fundamental, and cases in which they are actually derivative. Suppose the 
temporal facts are actually fundamental.  According to NOF, it follows that in any world 
in which time exists, the temporal facts are fundamental. Consequently in all worlds with 
temporal facts, the structured ground of those facts is the ordered pair consisting of the 
empty set ∅ and the empty relation on ∅. So temporal facts are (trivially) uniquely 
groundable.  
 
But now suppose that the temporal facts are actually derivative. Then nothing follows 
from our grounding principles regarding whether temporal facts are uniquely or multiply 
groundable. This is a good thing, since if the unique groundability of temporal facts 
followed from perfectly general principles, that could only be because every derivative fact 
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is uniquely groundable. This would be far too strong. If temporal facts are uniquely 
groundable, then this must be in virtue of some specific features of time itself. 
 
Having said that, learning about the actual structured ground of the temporal facts does 
tell us a variety of things about the possible structured grounds of the temporal facts, 
conditional on our grounding principles being true. Suppose that actually the A-facts are 
fundamental, and these underpin the B-facts, which underpin the temporal facts. (See w1 
in Figure 1.) Then we know some things about the possible structured grounds of time. 
We know that in any world with A-facts, those facts are fundamental (by NOF); and that 
they ground the B-facts facts in all such worlds (by G-NEC). Further, we know that 
there are no worlds in which B-facts are fundamental (by NOF) and no worlds in which 
B-facts underpin A-facts (by NRGP). It follows that in any worlds in which there are A-
facts, those A-facts are a sufficient ground for both the A-facts and the B-facts. Given 
our definitions, it follows that any world containing A-facts is an A-theoretic world.  
 
Alternatively, suppose that the actual world is one in which the B-facts are fundamental 
and underpin the A-facts, which in turn underpin the temporal facts. (See w2 in Figure 
1.) Then the A-facts are, necessarily, derivative (by NOF); and in any world with B-facts, 
the B-facts ground the A-facts (by G-NEC); and in no world with A-facts do these 
ground the B-facts (by NRGP). So in any world with B-facts, the B-facts are a sufficient 
ground for the A-facts, and for the temporal facts. So, by our definitions, any world 
containing B-facts is a B-theoretic world. 
 
What if neither A-facts nor B-facts are fundamental? One might think this leaves open 
the possibility that there exists a pair of worlds, w and w* such that in w, [x] underpins 
the A-facts, which underpin the B-facts, which underpin the temporal facts; and in w*, 
[y] underpins the B-facts, which underpin the A-facts, which underpin the temporal 
facts. If so, then the temporal facts are ultimately grounded by two different things: [x] in 
one world, and [y] in the other. Not so. One of these worlds is impossible if NRGP 
holds. If A-facts underpin B-facts in w, then by NRGP there is no world in which B-
facts underpin A-facts. Thus if w is possible then w* is not.  
 
Given the grounding principles we have outlined, if A-facts and B-facts are both 
derivative, then they are of necessity derivative, and it is possible that they are differently 
grounded in different worlds. But whatever the relative whole grounding relations 
between A-facts and B-facts are actually, that relativity of grounds will hold across all 
worlds (by NRGP). Thus although there may be worlds where the temporal facts have a 
different structured ground, the various grounding principles significantly constrain the 
ways in which the structure of this ground can vary across worlds.  
 
Nevertheless, this does not show that the temporal facts are uniquely groundable. It 
leaves open the possibility that there are worlds in which A-facts do not underpin B-facts 
and worlds in which B-facts do not underpin A-facts. If such worlds are possible then 
there will be a pair of worlds w and w* such that in w, [x] underpins the A-facts, and the 
A-facts ground, but do not underpin, the B-facts, and the B-facts underpin the temporal 
facts; and in w*, [y] underpins the B-facts, and the B-facts ground, but do not underpin, 
the A-facts, and the A-facts underpin the temporal facts. Nothing in our grounding 
principles rules out the existence of w and w*. But w and w* are worlds in which the 
temporal facts have different structured grounds.  
 
4. Defending Necessitarianism  
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In this section we defend necessitarianism: the view that either the A-theory or the B-
theory is necessarily false. We do this by arguing that temporal facts are uniquely 
groundable. Recall: [x] is uniquely groundable if and only if [x] has the same structured 
ground in all worlds in which [x] obtains. We will defend the unique groundability of 
temporal facts by arguing that such facts are necessarily grounded in whatever way they 
are grounded in the actual world. From unique groundability, necessitarianism follows. 
To see this, note that contingentism entails that temporal facts are multiply groundable: if 
contingentism is true, then there is an A-theoretic world, w, and a B-theoretic world, w*; 
and since the A-theory and the B-theory are incompatible claims about the structured 
ground of temporal facts, it follows that the temporal facts have different structured 
grounds in w and w*; and so those facts are multiply groundable. Since contingentism 
entails that the temporal facts are multiply groundable, unique groundability entails 
necessitarianism. Therefore, to defend necessitarianism it suffices to show that the 
temporal facts are uniquely groundable. 
 
We now give two reasons for accepting the unique groundability of the temporal facts. 
 
 
4.1 Obstacles to defining time functionally 
 
One reason for accepting the unique groundability of the temporal facts is that we lack 
one of the usual reasons for taking facts to be multiply groundable.  Consider why one 
might think that some fact [x] is multiply groundable. Typically, we find such a claim 
plausible when what it is to be a kind of object, or type of substance, which in turn is a 
constituent of a fact such as [x], is to be something that plays a certain functional role. 
For example, why think (some) facts involving mental states are multiply groundable? 
Because we think that what it is to be a mental state is to play a certain role in 
something’s overall mental economy, and that what it is to be a particular mental state is 
to a play a particular functional role in that economy. Moreover, we think that different 
sorts of things could play that functional role.  
 
Some, like Mark Johnston,20 think water is like this (though of course this is not the 
orthodox view). Thus Johnston thinks that in our world the fact that there is water is 
grounded by the fact that there is H2O, while in other worlds this fact is grounded by 
something else — say the fact that there is XYZ, where XYZ is a potable clear liquid. 
The reason to think that the fact that there is water is multiply groundable is precisely 
that one thinks that water is a functional kind, and that something is water just in case it 
plays a particular functional role.  
 
Recall that we are supposing that there is time in a world iff there are temporal facts in 
that world. Thus, we think, the principal reason to think that the temporal facts are 
multiply groundable is if one thinks that time ought to be defined functionally. 
 
We do not take ourselves to be able to show that time cannot be defined functionally. 
Rather, in what follows, we offer some reasons to be sceptical that there is an adequate 
functional definition of time. Thus we aim to shift the burden of proof onto the 
defender of the view that temporal facts can have different structured grounds in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Johnston (1997).	  
	   12	  
different worlds: those claiming that this is possible owe us a functional account of the 
nature of time that permits time to be multiply realisable. 
 
One reason to be sceptical that time ought be defined functionally is that it is unclear 
what the functional role of time could be.21 Time does not seem to be relevantly like 
water (if you think Johnston is right about water) or the desire for ice cream. Baron and 
Miller (2015) note that one obstacle to providing a functional characterisation of time is 
that it is difficult to avoid characterisations that are either obviously too inclusive, or 
obviously not inclusive enough. For instance, one might pick out a very general high-
level role: one might say that time is whatever is discoverable by the physical sciences and 
partially orders events into a metrical structure. But plausibly, any such account will be 
too permissive: any number of relations that are most definitely not temporal can be 
used to partially order events and yield a metrical structure. On the other hand, strategies 
that build more into the characterisation of time quickly become too exclusive. If we 
build in more physical constraints, say by talking about the specific roles of time in 
various physical theories, then we risk it turning out that there is actually no time (if 
those physical theories are false), or that there is only time in worlds very physically 
similar to ours. Furthermore, if we say that time is whatever is discoverable by science 
and partially orders moments into a metrical structure of earlier-than and later-than relations, 
then we prejudge matters in favour of the B-theorist; and it is, at any rate, no longer 
obvious that we are offering a functionalist account of time. Moreover, the resulting 
characterisation is arguably not permissive enough: it will result in concluding that 
actually there is no time if there are only C-relations but no B-relations as some (for 
instance Huw Price) contend.22  
 
We cannot show that there is no way to define time functionally along something like 
these lines. However, since it is far from obvious how such a definition would work, we 
think there is good reason to be sceptical, at least until a functionalist about time offers 
us a promising story. We thus take the burden of proof to lie with the functionalist here. 
The only functionalist story that has been advanced in any detail comes from Baron and 
Miller (2015). Their suggestion is that we define the time role in terms of the effects that 
time has on creatures like us: time is whatever physical phenomenon is discoverable by 
the physical sciences and is responsible for our temporal phenomenology. (Roughly, our 
temporal phenomenology is our partitioning the world into ordered moments, our 
experiencing them in said order, our experiencing the present with a certain vividness, 
and our having differential attitudes towards events that are partitioned as being in the 
past as opposed to future. This is analogous to (partly) defining water in terms of it being 
clear and potable: water is only clear and potable relative to our particular visual and 
gastronomic systems.) If this proposal succeeds, contingentism will look more plausible. 
Let us now assess the proposal.  
 
We begin by drawing a distinction. If time is functionally characterised, then in order to 
establish whether or not temporal facts are multiply groundable, we must specify how to 
use the functional role of time in order to determine what our term ‘time’ picks out in 
non-actual worlds. Only then can we settle whether or not, given what ‘time’ picks out, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Perhaps there are multiple concepts of time deployed by different individuals, or different disciplines 
(perhaps there is a distinctly “physical” concept deployed in classical physics). For our purposes we are 
assuming that whatever concept of time and temporal facts is at issue, it is the one that metaphysicians of 
time deploy in their discussion of time. We assume that this is a shared concept (even if perhaps there are 
somewhat different conceptions of that concept).	  	  22	  Price (1996).	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the temporal facts in any given non-actual world are differently grounded to the actual 
temporal facts. There are two well-known strategies here. The first: in any given world, 
‘time’ picks out whatever plays the time role in that world. (This is analogous to a common 
view of mental state terms like ‘pain’.23) Call this the non-rigidifying strategy. The second 
strategy is to take the time role and rigidify: in any given world, ‘time’ refers to whatever 
plays the time role in the actual world. (This is analogous to a common view of natural kind 
terms like ‘water’.24) Call this the rigidifying strategy. We will assess the aforementioned 
functionalist proposal relative to each of these strategies. 
 
First, suppose that one accepts something like the Baron and Miller proposal, and 
endorses the non-rigidifying strategy. The non-rigidifying strategy requires us to 
determine, for each possible world, w, what (if anything) plays the time role in w. On the 
Baron and Miller proposal, this means determining what is responsible for the temporal 
phenomenology in w. But how are we to determine which phenomenology in w counts 
as temporal phenomenology?25 One option is to characterise the temporal phenomenology 
in w as the phenomenology for which time is responsible in w. But that option is 
unavailable here, since it will lead to a vicious circle: we are trying to pick out time in w 
by picking out the temporal phenomenology in w, so we cannot pick out the temporal 
phenomenology in w by picking out time in w.  Instead, one might try to characterise the 
temporal phenomenology in w by piggy-backing on our actual temporal phenomenology. 
For example, one might say that the temporal phenomenology in w is whatever 
phenomenology of this kind occurs in w, where the demonstrative is cashed out via a 
careful account of our actual temporal phenomenology. But this route is unpromising, 
for the following reason. Consider two counterfactual worlds, w and w*. Now, one may 
have firm intuitions about whether there is time in w and/or w*, or one may be unsure 
whether or not there is time in one or both worlds. But regardless, one does not need to 
know what kind of phenomenology obtains in those worlds in order to have a view 
about whether or not there is time in those worlds. Indeed, whether or not there is time 
in those worlds does not seem to be sensitive to the nature of the phenomenology in 
those worlds. If the only difference between w and w* were the nature of the 
phenomenology in those worlds, then it would seem implausible indeed that one 
contains time and the other does not. But if that is right, then an appeal to 
phenomenology is not the right way to proceed. We conclude that there is currently no 
viable way to define time functionally via the non-rigidifying strategy. Until such an 
account is forthcoming, we thus have good reason to reject the idea that time can be 
characterised in this way. 
 
Let us, then, turn to the rigidifying strategy. Recall the central idea: in world w, ‘time’ 
picks out whatever plays the time role in the actual world. This strategy promises to 
overcome the deficiencies of the rigidifying strategy: it merely requires us to determine 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  On this view, ‘pain’ refers in any given world to whatever states play the pain role in that world. 
Functionalists about mental states  often have this view, or the nearby view that ‘pain’ refers, in any world, 
to the second-order state of having something play the pain role in that world. See for instance Lewis 
(1966) for an early statement of the view and Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (1999); Phelan and Buckwalter 
(2012) for more recent ones. Thus creatures in other worlds can be in pain, even if their brains are radically 
different to ours.	  24	  On this view, ‘water’ refers in any given world to whatever actually plays the water role, namely H2O. 
Thus H2O in another world is water, even if it doesn’t play the water role in that world. Among those 
subscribe to this view of natural kinds are (Braddon-Mitchell (2004a); (2004b); (2009); Chalmers (2004); 
Jackson (1998); (2004); (2007); (2009) and Beebee and Sabbarton-Leary (2010).	  
25 The worry we identify here bears some similarity to that noted in Stroud (2000; p. 160) in the context of 
perceptions of colour. 
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what time is actually, via the relevant functional role, and then conclude that time is, 
necessarily, that phenomenon.26 
 
One might suspect that the rigidifying strategy simply delivers the result that temporal 
facts are uniquely groundable. That is, one might suspect that what it is to discover that 
time is the same thing in every world is to discover that the temporal facts have the same 
grounds in every world. But that cannot be right. What we discover here is an identity: 
we discover that time = X, where X is whatever actually plays the time role. We thus 
discover an identity relation between the temporal facts and some other set of facts. 
Since identity is not a grounding relation, we don’t discover anything about grounds. 
Moreover, discovering that some temporal fact is identical to some particular fact [x] in 
every world doesn’t preclude it being the case that [x] has different grounds in different 
worlds. Once we discover that the fact in question is identical to [x], we must still ask 
whether [x] is uniquely grounded. We think there is reason to think that it is.  
 
Here is why. The rigidifying strategy is typically associated with natural kinds and proper 
names.  ‘Time’ is not a proper name. But it is plausible that it is a natural kind term if, as 
we have just argued, it is not a functional term. Here is a plausible principle regarding 
natural kinds: 
 
NK: If ‘T’ is a natural kind term then the actual structured ground of [T exists], is, 
necessarily, the structured ground of [T exists].  
 
Should NK be accepted?  Consider the case of water. The orthodox view is that ‘water’ is 
a natural kind term. The thought is that, when we discover the chemical composition of 
water, we discover its essence: we discover that being H2O is its essence. Now, 
importantly, it does not immediately follow that [H2O exists] itself is not multiply 
grounded. For example, one might try to argue that ‘H2O’ is a functional expression 
(even if ‘water’ is not), and so that some fact that underpins [H2O exists], say [y], is 
multiply groundable. For instance, one might claim that [H2O exists] is grounded in 
[particles of a certain kind exist and are arranged in a certain way]; and one might also 
claim that this latter fact is multiply groundable—perhaps it is grounded in, say, 
[vibrating strings exist] in one world, and [computational facts exist] in some other world. 
If this view is correct, then NK is false. 
 
W think that this view is ultimately mistaken. While it is epistemically open that [H2O 
exists] is ultimately grounded in [vibrating strings exist], or ultimately grounded in 
[computational facts exist], we are inclined to think that whatever is actually the ultimate 
ground of [H2O exists] is necessarily the ultimate ground of [H2O exists]. We think it 
implausible, for example, that if actually [H2O exists] is ultimately grounded by [vibrating 
strings exists], that possibly [H2O exists] is ultimately grounded in [computational facts 
exist].  At least, we think this is implausible insofar as it is plausible that water is H2O and 
necessarily so. The principle here is this: facts about natural kinds do not obtain at higher 
levels, only to be grounded by lower-level facts that are themselves multiply groundable. 
To be sure, there are worlds in which there exists some stuff—call it XYZ—that is not 
water, but is superficially very similar to water. In such worlds, [XYZ exists] may well 
have a different structured ground to the actual structured ground of [H2O exists].  But 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26 	  One might think this is somewhat like the case of water if one thinks that the functional 
characterization of water as the potable clear stuff in the lakes provides a way to figure out where the water 
is, and then empirical testing tells us what that stuff is. Then water is, necessarily, whatever the actually 
potable clear stuff in the lakes is.	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this does not show that [H2O exists] has different structured grounds in different worlds, 
since [H2O exists] does not obtain in these XYZ-worlds. We think that what it is to 
discover that ‘T’ is a natural kind term is to discover that ‘T’ picks out something such 
that [T exists] has the very same structured grounds in every world; not merely that ‘T’ 
picks out something such that [T exists] has the same ground in every world, where that 
ground, in turn, might be differently grounded across worlds. For this reason, we 
endorse NK. 
 
If one endorses NK, then one has good reason to think that if the rigidifying strategy is 
right for ‘time’, then temporal facts have the same structured ground in every world that 
they have actually. In that case, temporal facts are uniquely groundable, and 
necessitarianism is vindicated. 
 
But suppose that one does not find NK plausible. Then, so far, we have only shown that 
time is, of necessity, whatever actually plays the time role. But if NK is false, then for all 
we have said so far, it could be that whatever actually plays the time role, call it TIME, is 
such that [TIME exists] is multiply groundable. In that case, it could be that the temporal 
facts are multiply groundable, contrary to necessitarianism. 
 
We think there are independent reasons to rule this possibility out. Suppose we discover 
that time is TIME (and necessarily so), since TIME is what actually plays the time role.  
Then [TIME exists] iff [temporal facts exist]. Now, if [TIME exists] is multiply 
groundable, then there is a world, w*, in which [TIME exists] has a different structured 
ground to its actual structured ground. Moreover, in some world w**, TIME does not 
play the time role (just as in some world, H2O does not play the water role). Given that 
these two factors vary independently, there will be still another world, w***, in which 
[TIME exists] has a different structured ground to the one it has actually and in which 
TIME plays a different role to the one it plays actually.  According to the view under 
consideration, since TIME is, necessarily, time, world w*** is one in which there is time. 
But we do not see why we should think that TIME is time in w***. We might be inclined 
to think TIME is time if it shared the same structured ground as TIME in our world, just 
as we are inclined to say that H2O is water in worlds in which it shares the same 
structured ground as actual H2O, even if in those worlds it does not play the water role. 
Furthermore, we might be inclined to think that TIME is time if, despite not having the 
same structured ground as it does actually, it plays the functional role of time in that 
world. But in w***, TIME does neither of these things. We are thus sceptical that there is 
good reason to accept that TIME is time. So, we think, there is good reason to accept 
that if time is, necessarily, whatever plays the time role, then whatever actually plays the 
time role, TIME, must be such that [TIME exists] has the same structured ground in 
every world. For it is in virtue of having the same structured ground in every world that 
we can legitimately identity what actually plays the time role (TIME) as time, across 
worlds in which TIME fails to play the time role. If correct, this vindicates 
necessitarianism. 
 
Let us make one final point. Arguably, not all cases of multiply groundability are the 
result of some phenomenon being functionally defined. One might think, for instance, 
that [pain exists] is multiply groundable, but that pain is not defined by its functional 
role. For instance, one might think that pain is an experience with a phenomenal 
character like this, where ‘this’ is a demonstrative that points to an experience with a 
particular phenomenal character. If we call this phenomenal character P, then pain is 
whatever experience has P. On this view, [pain exists] might well be multiply groundable. 
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Applied to the case of time, however, matters are not so straightforward. Time is not an 
experience. We could say that time is whatever is responsible for those of our 
experiences with a certain phenomenal character; but that just brings us back to a 
strategy we have already considered, since, in effect, it defines time functionally. The 
other option is to say that time is that thing, where that thing is a demonstrative. Then, so 
long as that thing is multiply groundable, the temporal facts are multiply groundable. The 
problem is that we cannot point to time, in even the figurative sense in which can point 
at an experience of pain.  To get a handle on what we would be pointing to, we would 
need some sort of functional definition to get the process off the ground (namely, I’m 
pointing at the thing that does these things). Therefore, even if non-functional accounts can 
sometimes give rise to multiple groundability, this is not plausibly the case for temporal 
facts. 
 
4.2 Actuality bias 
 
Another reason to accept the unique groundability of temporal facts is that it neatly 
accommodates what we might call an ‘‘actuality bias” in folk judgments about the nature 
of time. There is some empirical evidence that, with respect to a range of cases, the folk 
show an actuality bias. We think it plausible that the same bias extends to the case of 
time. 27 We think that there are certain features, F, such that: (i) should the folk discover 
that the actual world has F, they would judge F to be necessary for time in other, non-
actual worlds; but (ii) were the folk to discover that the actual world lacks F, they would 
nevertheless judge that the actual world contains time. For example, one candidate for F 
is the feature of containing an objectively present moment. Were the folk to discover 
that the actual world does contain an objectively present moment, we think, they would 
regard this as a necessary condition for time, thereby concluding that any world without 
an objectively present moment is one without time. On the other hand, were they to 
discover that the actual world does not contain an objectively present moment, but 
merely relations of earlier and later than, then they wouldn’t judge that there is actually no 
time. Rather, they would relax their standards, concluding that relations of earlier and 
later than are sufficient for time (and necessarily so).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  This is a piece of empirical speculation. A study that tests it is currently underway. Having said that, we 
do have data about a range of responses that subjects (non-philosophers) have to other cases that are 
relevantly similar. (This data is currently unpublished, but can be made available.) For instance, we have 
data about what those who think there is actually libertarian free will are inclined to say if we ask them to 
suppose that we discover that actually, indeterminism is false. (Namely, we have data about whether they 
are inclined to become error theorists about free will.) We also have data about what folk who are dualists 
are inclined to say when we ask them to suppose that they discover that actually, there are no dualistic 
conscious states.  
In both cases we find that folk are fairly disinclined to become error theorists, and are inclined instead to 
alter what they take to be necessary for existence of free will or consciousness.  At present, the number of 
those who fail to become error theorists is just over 50%. However, the data suggests that this might in 
part be an effect of some subjects being unable to imagine the case in which they discover that actually, 
the world is different from how they do (in fact) take it to be. In order to test this, we currently have a 
study underway in which subjects are trained up in being able to imagine that the actual world is different 
to how they suppose it to be. Our hypothesis is that amongst subjects able to do this, the proportion of 
subjects who become error theorist will be significantly less than 40%. We also think that, when the data 
comes in on subjects with regard to their views about time, subjects who have passed the training phase 
will, by and large, tend not to become error theorists. However, this data is not yet ready and so the above 
claim is, at this stage, empirical speculation. 	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The unique groundability of temporal facts delivers these judgments. Why should that be 
a good thing? We take it that, other things being equal, it is better if one’s metaphysical 
theory accommodates sufficiently robust folk judgements made after reflection. So that is 
a weak reason to prefer the view that temporal facts are uniquely groundable over the 
view that they are not. A better reason is that folk concepts play an important subject 
setting role: they tell us how the world would need to be, in order for a concept to be 
satisfied. Even if (as is no doubt the case) there are more fine-grained concepts of time 
found in the physical sciences, we should still care what it takes for there to be time in 
the folk sense (arguably the sense that is deployed in our understanding of deliberation 
and agency) and hence whether there is anything that answers to the folk concept of 
time. Showing that the unique groundability of temporal facts accords with our folk 
judgments about time shows that the phenomenon we are claiming to be uniquely 
groundable really is the phenomenon that the folk care about, and pick out by ‘time’.   
 
Consider the worlds in Figure 2. 
 
!
Temporal!facts!!
B/facts!
w1!Actual!world!
A/facts!
Temporal*!facts!!
A/facts!
w2!Counterfactual!world!!!
B/facts!
 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
The worlds in Figure 2 are similar to w1 and w2 from Figure 1. But, unlike Figure 1, 
Figure 2 represents that w1 is the actual world. If we are right and temporal facts are, 
necessarily, grounded by the same structured ground as they are actually, then it follows 
that w2 as represented in Figure 1 is impossible. There are worlds with the same 
structured ground as w2 as represented in Figure 1, but no such worlds are ones in which 
that structured ground grounds temporal facts. Instead, if w1 is actual then what is 
grounded in w2 could be called temporal* facts. In labelling those facts temporal* facts, 
however, we do not wish to suggest that temporal* facts are really very much like 
temporal facts (the way XYZ is very much like water, as least superficially) but simply fail 
to be temporal facts because they lack the actual structured grounds of the temporal 
facts. As we discuss shortly, there is no reason at all to suppose that is so. We call the 
facts temporal* facts merely because they are the facts that exist at the same location in 
the grounding structure as do the actual temporal facts.  
 
Alternatively, suppose that w2 in Figure 1 is actual. We can represent this by Figure 3. 
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!
Temporal*!facts!!
B0facts!
w1!Counterfactual!world!
A0facts!
Temporal!facts!!
A0facts!
w2!Actual!world!!!
B0facts!
 
 
Figure 3 
 
If w2 is actual then there is actually no objectively present moment, because temporal 
facts are grounded by A-facts that are in turn underpinned by B-facts. The unique 
groundability of temporal facts entails that in all worlds with time, the temporal facts 
share this structured ground.28 Thus, we argue, if w2 is actual, then worlds like w1 are not 
worlds with time. This might seem objectionable, and we return to this issue shortly. 
First, however, one might wonder whether the actuality bias can be accommodated by 
something weaker than unique groundability.  
 
For example, what if we demand not that temporal facts have the same structured ground 
in every world, but only that they have the same ground? That is: temporal facts are 
necessarily grounded by whatever grounds them in the actual world, but there can be 
different grounding relationships among those grounds in different worlds. This weaker 
restriction would not give us necessitarianism, since there are plausibly A-theoretic 
worlds and B-theoretic worlds in which temporal facts have the same ground. (For 
example: w1 and w2 in Figure 1.) 
 
We think the weaker restriction does not go far enough, for roughly the same reason that 
we think it is not objectionable that w1 fails to count as containing temporal facts (and 
hence time) if w2 is the actual world (as represented in Figure 3). Insofar as the folk have 
an actuality bias—insofar as one thinks that time just is (within certain constraints) 
whatever is responsible for certain phenomena with which we are phenomenologically 
familiar, and necessarily so—one ought to find it plausible that this actuality bias extends 
to the total grounding structure. Thus, on proper reflection, one ought not find it 
plausible that w1 contains time, conditional on w2 being the actual world. Why think 
this?   
 
Well, the intuition at play here is that time is the ‘thing’ with which we, here, are 
acquainted. It is the phenomenon that is responsible for our vast array of temporal 
phenomenologies. In w2 what ultimately grounds the temporal facts are the B-facts. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Note that unique groundability allows that there are some minimal features such that, were the folk to 
discover that the actual world lacks those features, they would conclude that there is actually no time. We 
are thus not forced to say that time exists no matter how metaphysically impoverished the actual world 
turns out to be: the folk’s standards may only relax so far.	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Now consider w1, in which the B-facts ground temporal* facts, but they, in turn, are 
grounded by A-facts. If time is the thing we are actually acquainted with, then there is 
every reason to believe that the phenomenon with which inhabitants of w1 are 
acquainted is quite different to the phenomenon with which we in the actual world are 
acquainted. Indeed, we can have little reason to suppose that the phenomenon with 
which those in w1 are acquainted generates a phenomenology that is anything like ours.  
 
To put it another way, return to our earlier discussion of the modal status of the A- and 
B-theories. We noted there that necessitarian standard A-theorists and necessitarian B-
theorists agree that it is the role in the grounding structure that, in effect, defines what it 
is to be an A-fact or a B-fact. The necessitarian standard A-theorist thinks that there 
simply are no B-facts that are not grounded by A-facts: what it is to be a B-fact is to be 
so grounded. Likewise, the necessitarian B-theorist thinks that what it is to be an A-fact 
is to be grounded by the B-facts. By contrast, the contingentist thinks that we can have 
an independent grasp on these two notions (A-facts and B-facts) – independent, that is, 
of their place in the grounding structure. For the contingentist thinks that the very same 
B-facts can obtain in one world without being grounded by A-facts, and in another as a 
result of being grounded in A-facts. But it is not, we think, so very obvious that in each 
case we have are the very same B-facts being differently grounded. If actually the B-facts 
are not grounded in the A-facts, it is not obvious that a world in which there are A-facts 
which ground some set of facts (which for instance, describe an ordering) ought rightly to 
be described as the B-facts. Similarly, we think, if actually the B-facts ground the A-facts, 
then it is not obvious that in a world in which some putative A-facts are not grounded in 
the B-facts, we ought really to describe the former as “A-facts”. For they bear little 
resemblance to the A-facts that are actually grounded in the B-facts: if they did, there 
would be little debate between the A- and B-theorist.  
 
Thus we think it plausible that, in part, what defines what it is to be an A-fact or a B-fact 
is where that fact sits in the actual grounding structure. If actually, the A-facts ground the 
B-facts, then in worlds where the B-facts are what does the grounding, we should label 
the facts thus grounded as something other than A-facts. Likewise, if actually the A-facts 
ground the B-facts, then in worlds where something other than A-facts grounds the 
(alleged) B-facts, we should label the facts thus grounded as something other than B-
facts. For there is really little reason to suppose that what we have are the same facts, 
differently grounded, across worlds. And the same is true for the temporal facts 
themselves. 
 
If our grasp of the concept of time comes via our phenomenology, then we should think 
that whatever it is with which those in w1 are acquainted, it does not deserve the label 
‘time’.  After all (we are supposing), in the actual world it turns out there is no objective 
present or objective passage of time. In w1, however, there are facts consisting of 
monadic dynamical properties that ground facts consisting of static relational properties. 
We might have been inclined to say that the former are A-facts, and the latter B-facts. 
But, as we have just argued, if w2 is the actual world then we ought pay close attention to 
just how foreign counterfactual world w1 would be, and we ought to resist any such 
temptation; and we ought also to resist the temptation to say that what is grounded by 
those facts are temporal facts.29  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 We wish to remain neutral about whether this means that facts concerning temporal topology are 
uniquely groundable. Nothing we have said here suggests that they are. It does not follow from any our 
principles of ground or from the unique groundability of temporal facts, that facts concerning temporal 
topology are themselves uniquely groundable. That is not to say that considerations similar to the ones we 
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5.  Consequences for the A/B debate 
 
Suppose one agrees with us that temporal facts are uniquely groundable. Then our 
arguments establish two conditional claims: if the actual world is A-theoretic, then all 
worlds with time are A-theoretic; and if the actual world is B-theoretic, then all worlds 
with time are B-theoretic. We thus have a pair of a priori conditionals, each with a 
potentially empirical antecedent and a modal consequent.  
 
As a consequence, facts about the actual world take on greater metaphysical significance. 
The unique groundability of temporal facts amplifies arguments concerning the actual 
world across modal space: one can have reason to draw modal conclusions about the 
structured ground of time, based on empirical features of our world. For instance, 
perhaps one thinks that, given considerations arising from the special theory of relativity, 
A-facts are grounded by B-facts, and that B-facts are further grounded by some more 
global features of space-time.30 Or perhaps one thinks that, given considerations arising 
from quantum mechanics, there must actually be a preferred foliation of space-time, and 
therefore that B-facts are grounded by A-facts. 31  Or perhaps one thinks that 
contemporary theories of quantum gravity show that actually, there is no time.32 Then 
one can conclude (respectively) that necessarily, the B-theory is true; or that necessarily, 
the A-theory is true; or that necessarily, there is no time. If our arguments succeed, then 
one important way to learn about modal space, vis-à-vis time, is to investigate the actual 
world. 
 
Indeed, we think that not only can one come to learn about modal space by investigating 
the actual world, but one ought, in many cases, to focus on the actual world when 
attempting to come to conclusions about modal space.  Of course, our claim is not that 
knowledge of the actual world is the only route to knowledge about modal space, in all 
cases: for example, if the A-series is logically inconsistent, then one can learn that the A-
theory is necessary false, without knowing anything about the contingent features of 
actuality.33 Nevertheless, the conclusions of this paper make certain procedures for 
arriving at modal truths look epistemically dubious. For example, suppose that one 
accepts our claim that whichever theory of time is true, it is true of necessity. Then one 
might be tempted to reason in the following way. First, some particular theory of time, T, 
is possibly true. (To support this, one might appeal to intuition.) Thus, since whichever 
theory is true, it is true of necessity, T is necessarily true. But if T is necessarily true, then 
T is actually true. Therefore, T is actually true. Note that this argument schema runs 
from possibility to actuality: one begins by discerning the possibility of a view of time 
(perhaps via intuition); and then, since possibility implies necessity, which in turn implies 
actuality, one concludes that the view in question is actually true. We would like to stress 
that our conclusions do not licence such arguments, but instead undermine their 
usefulness. If we are right, then one ought only to be confident that the structured 
ground of the temporal facts is, necessarily, whatever it is actually. If one does not know 
the actual structured grounds of time, then one has little reason to be confident that one 
can correctly discern whether some allegedly possible structured ground of temporal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
raise for thinking that temporal facts concerning temporal topology facts are also uniquely groundable. 
30 See for example Peterson and Silberstein (2010); Putnam (1967); Savitt (2000); Wuthrich (2011).  
31 Monton (2006); Sorkin (2006). 
32 Barbour (1999); Andersen (2012); see also Baron, Evans and Miller (2010).  
33 For example, McTaggart famously claims that the A-theory is inconsistent (McTaggart 1908). Others 
including Dyke (2002); Smith (2011); Oaklander (1987) have followed.	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facts really is a possible structured ground of temporal facts. The argument schema in 
question is thereby unsuccessful: one ought not be confident that one of the premises is 
true (that T is possible) unless one is already confident that the conclusion is true (that T 
is actual). One can justifiably be confident that if the structured ground claimed by T is 
possible, then this is what grounds the actual temporal facts. But it does not follow that 
one can justifiably be confident that it’s possible that the structured ground claimed by T 
grounds temporal facts.  
 
Compare, for instance, the following reasoning. Suppose that one does not (yet) know 
the actual structured ground of water. Suppose that one can establish that water has, 
necessarily, whatever structured grounds it has actually. Then one might be tempted to 
claim—perhaps by appealing to intuition—that for some structured ground S, it is 
possible that water has S. One might then infer that water actually has S. But this would 
clearly be a mistake. After all, S might say that water is grounded by XYZ: given one’s 
ignorance of the actual structured ground of water, this may well seem possible. The 
mistake here is to be confident that it’s possible that water has S: since one doesn’t know 
how water is actually grounded, one doesn’t know how it is possibly grounded. The right 
thing to say, given one’s ignorance of water’s actual structured ground, is that water is 
necessarily grounded in whatever way it is actually grounded. If our arguments in this 
paper succeed, then the same applies to time. Therefore, the lesson of the paper is in part 
cautionary: it is not merely that we can come to learn modal truths by attending to 
empirical truths about our world; it is also that in many cases, this will be the only reliable 
way to come to learn modal truths of this kind. 
 
 
 
References 
 
Anderson, E. (2012) The Problem of Time in Quantum Gravity. In Classical and Quantum 
Gravity: Theory, Analysis and Applications. Vincent. R. Frignanni (Ed.), pp. 1–25 (New York: 
Nova). 
 
Audi, Paul, R. (forthcoming). “A Clarification and Defense of the Notion of Grounding” 
in Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Schnieder (eds.) Grounding and Explanation, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Balaguer, M. (1998). Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics. New York:  Oxford 
University Press. 
 
 
Barbour, J. (1999). The End of Time.  Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Baron, S., Evans, P., and Miller, K. (2010) From Timeless Physical Theory to 
Timelessness. Humana Mente, 13, 35–59.   
 
Beebee, H and N Sabbarton-Leary (2010). “On the Abuse of the Necessary a Posteriori” 
in H Beebee and N Sabbarton-Leary (eds) The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. 
Routledge 159-79.  
 
	   22	  
 
Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2004a) “Masters of our Meanings”. Philosophical Studies 118 (1-
2):133-52. 
Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2004b). “Folk Theories of the Third Kind”. Ratio 17 (3):277-293.  
Braddon-Mitchell, D, (2009). “Naturalistic Analysis and the a Priori.” In Braddon-
Mitchell and R. Nola (eds.) (2009) Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. MIT 
Press. 
Braddon-Mitchell D and F Jackson (1999). “The Divide and Conquer Path to Analytic 
Functionalism” Philosophical Topics 26(1-2): 71-89. 
Butterfield, J. (1984). “Seeing the Present” Mind, 93, 161-76. 
 
Callender, C. (2000). “Shedding Light on Time” Philosophy of Science 67: S587-S599. 
Cameron, R. (2007). “The Contingency of Composition”. Philosophical Studies Vol.136, 
No.1 pp 99-121 
Chalmers, D. (2004). “Epistemic Two Dimensional Semantics” Philosophical Studies; 
118(1-2): 153-226. 
 
 
Colyvan, M. (2000). “Conceptual Contingency and Abstract Existence” Philosophical 
Quarterly 87-91. 
 
Colyvan, M. (2001). The Indispensability of Mathematics. OUP New York. 
 
Dummett, M. (1960). “A Defense of McTaggart’s Proof of the Unreality of Time” 
Philosophical Review 69 (4):497-504. 
Dyke, H. (2002). “McTaggart and the Truth about Time”. In In Craig Callender (ed.), 
Time, Reality and Experience. Cambridge University Press. 
Fine, K. (2005). “Tense and Reality” in  Kit Fine (ed.), Modality and Tense. Oxford 
University Press. 
Field, H. (1993). “The Conceptual Contingency of Mathematical Objects” Mind 
102(406): 285-299. 
Jackson, F. (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics. A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Clarenden 
Press.  
Jackson, F. (2004). “Why we need A-intensions.” Philosophical Studies. 118(1-2): 257-277 
 
Jackson. F. (2007). “Reference and Description from the Descriptivists’ Corner.” 
	   23	  
Philosophical Books 48 (1):17-26. 
 
Jackson, F. (2009). “A Priori Biconditionals and Metaphysics in  David Braddon-Mitchell 
& Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. MIT Press. 
  
Johnston,  M. (1997). “Manifest Kinds”. Journal of Philosophy 94(11): 564-583.  
 
 Lewis, D. (1966). ,“An Argument for the Identity Theory” Journal of Philosophy, LXIII, 
pp. 17–25; reprinted in Philosophical Papers Volume I, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1983, 
pp. 99–107, page references hereafter are to this edition.  
 
 
McTaggart, J. E. (1908). The Unreality of Time. Mind, 17(68), 457-474. 
 
Mellor, D. H. (1998). Real Time II, London: Routledge. 
 
Mellor, D. H. (1981). Real Time. Cambridge University Press.  
 
Miller, K. (2009) “Defending Contingentism in Metaphysics” Dialectica 62(1) pp 23-49  
 
Miller, K (2010) “Three routes to contingentism in metaphysics” Philosophy Compass 5(11) 
pp 965-977. 
 
 
Monton, B (2006). “Presentism and Quantum Gravity” In Dennis Dieks (ed). The 
Ontology of Space-time. Elsevier. 
 
Moxersky, J.M. (2000). “Time, Tense and Special Relativity.” International Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science 14(3): 221-236. 
 
Oaklander, L. Nathan. (1987). “McTaggart’s Paradox and the Infinite Regress of 
Temporal Attributions. Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):425-431 
 
Parsons, J. (2006) ‘Conceptual conservatism and contingent composition’. Unpublished. 
 
 
Peterson, D. and Silberstein, M. (2010). Relativity of Simultaneity and Eternalism: In 
Defense of the Block Universe. In Vesselin Petko (ed.). Space, Time and Space-time: 
Fundamental Theories of Physics. Volume 167, part 2, 209–237. Berlin: Springer. 
 
Phelan, M and W Buckwalter (2012). “Analytic Functionalism and Mental State 
Attribution” Philosophical Topics 40(2): 129-154.  
 
 
Price, H. (unpublished). The Flow of Time. 
 
Price, H. (1996). Time's arrow & Archimedes' point: new directions for the physics of time 
(Vol. New). New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
	   24	  
Putnam, H. (1967). Time and Physical Geometry. Journal of Philosophy 64, 240–247. 
 
Rasmussen, J. (2015). “Tenseless Times”. Philosophical Studies 172(12): 3221-3227 
 
Savitt, S. F. (2000). There's No Time Like the Present (in Minkowski Spacetime). 
Philosophy of Science, 67, Supplement. Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings of the 
Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers, 563–74. 
 
Schaffer, J. (2009). On What Grounds What. In D. Chalmers, D. Manley and R. 
Wasserman (Ed.), Metametaphysics, (pp. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
Smith, N.J.J. (2011). “Inconsistency in the A-theory.” Philosophical Studies 156 (2):231 - 
247. 
Sorkin, Rafael. 2006. Geometry from order: causal sets. In Einstein Online 02, 1007.  
 
Stroud, B. (2000). The Quest for Reality: Subjectivism and Metaphysics of Colour. OUP.  
 
Tallant, J. (2012). “(Existence) Presentism and the A-theory” Analysis 72 (4): 672-681. 
 
Trogdon, Kelly (forthcoming). “An Introduction to Grounding” in M. Hoeltje, B. 
Schnieder, and A. Steinberg (eds.), Basic Philosophical Concepts, Munich: Philosophia Verlag. 
 
Wüthrich, C. (2011). The Fate of Presentism in Modern Physics. In Robert Ciuni, Kristie 
Miller and Giuliano Torreng (eds.). New Papers On The Present – Focus On Presentism. 
Munich: Philosophia Verlag. 
Zimmerman, D. (2008) “The privileged present: Defending the A-Theory of time” in 
Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in 
Metaphysics. Blackwell Pub..211-226. 
 
Zimmerman, D. (2005) “The A-theory of time, the B-theory of time and “Taking Tense 
Seriously” Dialectica 59(4): 401-457. 
 
 
